Improving the IAEA’s ability to detect safeguard violations is not enough.  Potential violators must know that if they are caught, they will pay a high price.  That is certainly not the case today.  Despite American efforts, the international community’s record of enforcing compliance in recent years is unacceptable.  Compliance mechanisms and procedures must be improved.  We should consider adopting automatic penalties for violation of safeguards agreements; for example, suspending all international nuclear cooperation, or IAEA technical cooperation projects until compliance has been restored.

And because the role of the Security Council is so important on compliance issues, we are working to rebuild the consensus among the five permanent members on NPT enforcement.

We must also use financial and legal tools to better disrupt illicit proliferation networks.  This will mean tightening controls on transshipment, a key source of illicit trade, and strengthening Nuclear Suppliers Group restrictions on transfers of enrichment and reprocessing technology.  A reinvigorated nonproliferation regime should enable countries, especially developing countries, to enjoy the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy, while providing incentives for them not to build their own enrichment or reprocessing facilities.  These facilities are inherently capable of producing both fuel for nuclear reactors and the fissile cores of nuclear weapons and should not be allowed to proliferate.
我们还须运用金融和法律手段,更有效地瓦解从事扩散的非法网络。这将意味着更严格地控制转运——这是非法贸易的重要来源,并加强核供应国集团(Nuclear Suppliers Group)对浓缩与再加工技术转让的限制。一个更有力的不扩散体制应该使各国——尤其是发展中国家——能够享受和平利用核能的好处,同时为它们带来不建造自身铀浓缩与再加工设施的种种好处。这些设施的性质注定它们既能生产核反应堆燃料,也能生产核武裂变材料,因此不应增多。

But we need to ensure that states have access to nuclear fuel, a right guaranteed under the NPT.  The best way to accomplish this goal is by expanding fuel cycle options.  Multilateral fuel supply assurances, international fuel banks, and spent fuel repositories can enhance the confidence of states embarking on or expanding their nuclear power programs.  These initiatives will encourage countries to pursue legitimate civil nuclear plans without assuming the risk and expense of constructing their own fuel cycle facilities.  So we will support international fuel banks and effective fuel service arrangements as key components of our nonproliferation policy.

Now, we cannot divorce nonproliferation efforts from the challenge of reducing existing nuclear arsenals, both are part of the core bargain of the NPT.  All countries face a common danger from nuclear weapons, but the nuclear arms states, and especially the United States and Russia, have an obligation to reduce their weapons stockpiles.  And the Obama Administration is actively pursuing these steps.  We are negotiating an agreement with the Russians that will succeed the soon-to-expire START treaty, and significantly reduce the nuclear forces of both sides.  It will also set the stage for even deeper cuts in the future.
然而,我们无法把不扩散的努力与减少现有核武库的挑战截然分开。两者都是《不扩散核武器条约》的重要条件。所有国家都面临来自核武器的共同危险,但有核国家——尤其是美国和俄罗斯——有责任减少各自的武器库存,而奥巴马政府正在积极采取这些步骤。我们正在与俄罗斯方面谈判一项协议,接替即将到期的《削减战略武器条约》(START Treaty),并大幅度削减双方的核军备。它也将为今后作出更大削减创造条件。

Let me be clear:  the United States is interested in a new START agreement because it will bolster our national security.  We and Russia deploy far more nuclear weapons than we need or could ever potentially use without destroying our ways of life.  We can reduce our stockpiles of nuclear weapons without posing any risk to our homeland, our deployed troops or our allies.