The non-nuclear weapon states also have a responsibility to work to prevent further proliferation.  That responsibility does not end with their decision to forgo their own weapons ambitions and accept safeguards to demonstrate the sincerity of that decision.  It must continue with active participation in resolute efforts to impede additional countries from crossing the nuclear threshold, because their own security and well-being are profoundly affected by the outcome of such efforts.
无核国家也有责任为防止进一步的扩散而进行努力。这一责任不仅限于决定放弃寻求核武器并接受保障体制以就该决定表示出诚意,还必须体现于继续积极参与,作出果断努力,阻止更多国家突破核门槛, 因为它们自身的安全和利益将深受这些努力结果的影响。所有核材料或核技术拥有国都有责任防止它们被偷盗或被非法转运。

All states with nuclear materials or technology have a responsibility to protect them against theft or illicit transfer.  Now if all countries step up to these responsibilities, as we are doing, we can revitalize the nonproliferation regime for decades to come.  The cornerstone of that regime, the NPT, remains sound and need not be altered.  But as we have done for 40 years, we must build on that essential foundation by supplementing the treaty and updating the overall regime with measures designed to confront emerging challenges.

The Administration’s blueprint for our efforts is based on the hard, day-to-day work of active diplomacy — confronting proliferators, strengthening the capabilities of the IAEA and ensuring that all nations abide by the rights and obligations of the nonproliferation regime, negotiating a new treaty with Russia to reduce our nuclear arsenal, seeking ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and prompt negotiation of a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, undertaking a review of the role of nuclear weapons in the United States’s defense strategy, and supporting budgetary priorities that guarantee the safety and effectiveness of our deterrent.

Now, I am well aware of the difficult road ahead to uphold the NPT, restore the international nonproliferation consensus, and reinvigorate the global nonproliferation regime.  Progress will not be easy.  At times, our achievements may [seem] incomplete and unsatisfying, but we are committed to seeing this through, and we believe the world is depending on our success.  The reality is that the nuclear threat cannot be checked by us acting alone.  Whether we seek to prevent the smuggling of dangerous nuclear materials, establish a new international framework for civil nuclear energy cooperation, increase the IAEA’s budget, or persuade governments with nuclear weapons ambitions to abandon their quest, we can only achieve our goals through cooperation with others.  In recent years, however, polarization within the international community on proliferation issues between states with nuclear weapons and those without have created obstacles to the cooperation that is needed.
我非常清楚,要维持《不扩散核武器条约》,恢复国际不扩散共识以及重振全球不扩散体制,未来的道路是艰难的。进展将不会一帆风顺。有时,我们的成就可能看似不彻底、不能令人满意。然而, 我们有决心完成这项事业。我们认为世界有赖于我们的成功。现实情况是,仅靠我们单独行动是不能遏制核威胁的。无论是防止危险的核材料的偷运,建立新的民用核能合作的国际框架,增加国际原子能机构的预算,还是说服有核武器企图的政府放弃其计划,我们只有通过与别国合作才能实现我们的目标。然而,近年来国际社会在扩散问题上出现了两极分化,有核国家与无核国家之间的分歧为必要的合作带来障碍。

Overcoming these obstacles must start from the premise that the nuclear threat is a danger that all nations face together, and that preventing the spread of nuclear weapons is not just in the interests of the existing nuclear weapon states, as it is sometimes asserted.  Indeed, the non-nuclear weapon states have as much or more to lose if these weapons spread or are ever used again.  The same logic applies to our work to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism.  A nuclear terrorist bomb detonated anywhere in the world would have vast economic, political, ecological and social consequences everywhere in the world.