Everyone’s going MOOC-crazy these days. From frequent media coverage of online courses and platforms like Coursera, edX, Udacity, and Udemy to discussions about the complexities and business models of online education, the excitement around MOOCs (Massive Open Online Courses) has finally “bubbled” over.

在最近的这些日子里,MOOC 让每个人为之疯狂。在媒体对在线课程及诸如 Coursera, edX, Udacity, Udemy 这些平台的大规模报道,以及关于其复杂性和商业模式的各种讨论之后,围绕 MOOC 的各种兴奋终于归于平静。

The question is not just whether MOOCs are going to disrupt traditional education, but how. Is it just about lower costs and access? Is it really going to be a Napster-like moment with entrenched “Teamsters in tweed” worried about the erosion of their research, publishing, and teaching?

但当前的问题已不是 MOOC 是否会颠覆传统教育,而是会如何颠覆传统教育。难道 MOOC 的优势仅在于更低的成本和更便捷的学习渠道?MOOC 真会如某些老顽固所言,侵蚀他们的研究、出版和教学活动,造就诸如当年Napster颠覆音乐行业的时刻?

This is where we can leave the realm of hype and commentary to draw on our own years of research into disruption theory. Because the curious thing about the MOOC wave of disruption is that the market leaders — not just upstarts from the edges — are the ones pioneering it. And that rarely happens.

在关于 MOOC 的各种炒作和评论之外,我们得以分享我们自己就颠覆性创新的多年研究。因为,这一波由 MOOC 掀起的颠覆式浪潮中有一点足让人好奇,即那些处于市场中心的既得利益者,而不仅仅是那些处于市场边缘的创业团队,在率先引导(制造)这样一个变革, 而这种情况,此前很少发生。

But First: Are MOOCs Really ‘Disruptive’?

Yes, the word “disrupt” is overused. But it has a specific meaning when we’re talking about it. And MOOCs do bear the early hallmarks of a disruptive innovation:

首先,MOOC果真在“颠覆”吗?

没错,“颠覆”这个词已经被用烂了。不过,这个被用烂的词背后实际有其指代,我们说 MOOC 是颠覆式的,也确实名正言顺,原因有三:

Serves non-consumers. MOOCs are limited in the services they provide compared to traditional colleges, yet at the same time they are free and more accessible — which allows them to serve those who couldn’t otherwise access traditional higher education. Similarly, Toyota’s early cars didn’t match the reliability of Detroit’s automobiles. But they were more affordable and convenient, so the company first served people (“non-consumers”) for whom the alternative was, quite literally, nothing.

1.非目标客户终于被包括进来:跟传统高校的服务相比,MOOC 确有很多不足之处。但与此同时,MOOC 的各类课程却是免费的,而且也更容易获取——这就使得它们可以辐射到那些原本无福消受高等教育的一大群用户。举个类似的例子,丰田早期的汽车就没有底特律各大公司产的可靠性那么强,但因为丰田的车子更便宜也更方便,所以这家公司第一次让那些非目标客户变成了目标客户——对这部分用户来说,几乎不存在其他公司提供的可行方案。

Marches upmarket. Instead of serving the same customers at the outset or competing head-on with established products, disruptive innovations improve over time to march upmarket. Eventually the quality becomes just good enough for the established customers to flock to it. It’s worth noting that the upmarket march is enabled by some key technology — such as bandwidth, video quality, online sharing tools, etc. — which is why MOOCs may now be having their moment, even though they’ve been around for years.

2.逐渐向中高端市场挺进:颠覆性创新往往不是一开始上来就跟既得利益者抢客户、与其正面较量,而是随着时间的推进不断优化,逐渐挺进中高端市场。但最终,颠覆性产品的性能会达到足够好,让市场中既有的客户乖乖奔向他们。不过需要注意的一点是,实现上述这种情况往往有赖于某些核心技术的成熟——比如说带宽、视频质量、在线分享工具的保障等——这些都是 MOOC 现在崛起的原因,尽管它们已经存在了数年。

Redefines quality. Eventually, the disruptive innovation changes the very definition of quality in a marketplace. In the current university system, for example, most faculty are rewarded for the quality of their research — not for the quality of their teaching. But the medium and scale changes things; in the future, courses might be offered based on employer demand, not faculty research interests. MOOCs are already evolving in some ways away from traditional educational constraints: Udacity’s courses, for example, have shifted from a time-controlled to a more competency-based learning model that takes advantage of the online medium.

3.重新定义什么叫好:最终,颠覆性创新会改变整个市场对于“品质”的定义。在现有的大学体系下,举个例子,大部分教师的评级标准都是基于他们的学术研究质量——而非他们的教学质量。但是,互联网媒介和规模化将开启新的变革。在未来,提供哪些课程将取决于雇主(这里指付费的学生),而非教师的研究兴趣。目前,MOOC 已经在几个方向上摆脱传统教育束缚逐渐演变:举个例子,Udacity 的课程就开始发挥在线媒介的优势,从一个基于时间控制的学习模式转向一个基于个人能力的学习模式(按学生的掌握情况而非简单地依照学时推进课程)。

Does Who Is Doing the Disrupting Matter?

Given the above criteria, it’s unusual, and remarkably difficult, for established market leaders to pioneer — or even catch up — with disruptions.

到底谁在牵头搞颠覆,这事重要吗?

基于上述的三个标准,让市场中固有的既得利益者做变革的先驱者,甚至说是赶上颠覆的节奏,这种情况不但不常见,而且困难重重。

Yet interestingly, the big, reputable universities are the ones leading the MOOC wave. This includes MIT and Harvard (through edX) as well as Stanford, whose groundbreaking AI course morphed into Udacity (and whose professors independently founded Coursera).

但很有意思的一点是,现在恰是那些牛哄哄的大学在引领这样一波变革浪潮,这其中就包括 MIT 和哈佛(通过 edX 的项目),以及斯坦福,后者的突破性人工智能课程逐渐演变成了今时的 Udacity,而斯坦福的教授也自立门户,创建了 Coursera。

It’s not that established players can’t see the disruptions coming; they almost always do. There are just several other forces at play that cause market leaders to ignore them. For example, disruptive innovations don’t look that attractive, profitable, or prestigious early on. Or the company’s best customers signal that they don’t care for them (at least initially). But universities are likely investing in MOOCs now because disruption theory is finally widely enough understood that astute leaders know how to identify and chase opportunities early.

大伙儿可能存在一个普遍误解,即认为那些记得利益者无法预见颠覆的到来,但事实上,他们几乎每次都可以,只是,存在其他的几个因素使得已有的市场领跑者对其疏落。举个例子,颠覆性创新在早期看起来往往不那么诱人、有利可图、或享有很高的声望;也可能,该家公司中最有价值的那部分客户表示对它不感兴趣(起码是在一开始)。但是,现在各个高校倾向于投资 MOOC,则是因为历史的一次次重演终于让“颠覆性”理论广为人知,而那些精明的领先者也知道如何在早期就去判断、争取各种机会。

When established players want to (successfully) catch a disruptive wave, however, they have to set up an autonomous business model with different resources, processes, and priorities. Otherwise, the very capabilities that serve them well in their traditional business can represent liabilities in the one they’re disrupting. This is how IBM was able to go from the mainframe to personal computing business in the ’80s and ’90s, and it’s why MOOCs have done well in spinning themselves off into separate entities.

不过,假如既得利益者想要成功地抓住一次颠覆性浪潮中的机会,那么他们必须单独开辟与他们既有业务不同的,在资源、流程、优先级等方面都独立的商业模式——否则,让他们在传统业务中吃香喝辣的各种流程很有可能会成为新型的颠覆性业务中的拖油瓶。IBM 就是依靠这么一个独立战略,成功在上世纪八九十年代从大型机转型 PC 业务,这也是为什么 MOOC 可以从母体(高等院校)脱离成为独立实体的原因。

Although the big three MOOCs — Coursera, edX, and Udacity — all leverage capabilities from their “parent” universities, they still have to be careful about which ones to adopt and which ones to avoid. Ideally, they should be able to pull what they want instead of having their university parents push resources (like administrative processes) to them.

尽管目前 MOOC 的三座大山 Coursera, edX, and Udacity 全部都利用了母体的资源,但它们仍需要谨慎处理,到底哪些模式是可以吸收的,哪些是需要回避的。在理想情况下,它们应该要掌握自主权,从母体中抽取它们想要的那部分资源,而非由母体强制输送(比如各种陈旧的行政制度)。

The only place the direction of this relationship doesn’t matter, according to our research, is brand. Being associated with the likes of Harvard, MIT, and Stanford doesn’t hurt, especially when it comes to signaling quality (i.e., “endorser” brands), as long as the disruptor can signal some separation for a job well done (i.e., “purpose” brands) in the new disruptive realm — hence the power of the “X” in edX. Leveraging its brand helped IBM move through multiple disruptive waves.

基于我们的研究,在 MOOC 尝试对自己跟母体的关系趋利避害时,唯一无须顾忌的一个方向是“品牌”。公众将某个 MOOC 平台与哈佛、MIT 和斯坦福这样的高校联系在一起,对这些平台并无伤害,尤其是谈到教学品质时(即所谓的背书人品牌),只要颠覆者可以说明,在新的颠覆领域,他们所做的事与既有模式不同即可(即所谓的目标品牌) ——而这也就是 edX 中“X”这个字母背后的力量(x 是数学中的一个变量,代表参与高校的数量,edX 背后影射的是一流高校联盟,即说明高校品牌的巨大影响力)。IBM 就是巧用了自身品牌的力量,成功突破几次颠覆性浪潮。

So What Comes Next for the MOOCs?

MOOCs can be much more than marketing and edutainment. We believe they are likely to evolve into a “scale business”: one that relies on the technology and data backbone of the medium to optimize and individualize learning opportunities for millions of students.

所以,MOOC将走向何方?

MOOC 可不仅仅是营销和寓教于乐。我们认为,它们很有可能会演变成“规模化的业务”,这一业务会依赖互联网媒介的技术和数据,让成千上万学生的学习机会得以实现最优化、个性化。

This is very different than simply putting a video of a professor lecturing online.

The initial MOOCs came from a “process business model” where companies bring inputs together at one end and transform them into a higher-value output for customers at the other end — as with the retail and manufacturing industries.

这跟简单将教授的一个讲座视频放到网上完全是两码事。

最初的 MOOC 还依赖于一个“流程型的商业模式”,即教育公司将所有内容输入聚于一端,然后将这些内容转化成价值更高的输出提供给另一端的客户——这跟零售和制造业是一样的。

But over time, an approach where users exchange information from each other similar to Facebook or telecommunications (a “facilitated network model”) will come to dominate online learning. This evolution is especially likely to happen if the traditional degree becomes irrelevant and, as many predict, learning becomes a continuous, on-the-job learning process. Then the need for customization will drive us toward just-in-time mini-courses.

但随着时间的推移,用户间自主交换信息的模式,诸如用户间在 Facebook 上互动,或远程通讯互动一样(类似开放平台的概念),将会逐渐统治在线教育。这种演变很有可能会发生——假如,正如很多人预言的那样,传统的学位制度退居二位,个体的学习变成一个连续性的、终身式的过程。那么,对个性化的需求将驱动我们选择那些基于 JIT 准时制(丰田在 20 世纪 60 年代实行的一种生产方式,可理解为在需要的时候,按需要的量生产所需的产品)的迷你课程。

In this case, facilitated networks or adaptive learning platforms — like Khan Academy and Knewton — may actually be better positioned than MOOCs (in their current forms) to improve learning and serve massive numbers of students with tailored offerings. Such a transformation is not unlike what happened in the car industry: The Ford Model T dominated the American car market … until General Motors brought forth choice and variety.

在这种情况下,促进式网络(facilitated networks)或那些自适应的学习平台——比如像可汗学院和Knewton这样的,通过为学生量身定制的产品,就可能比 MOOC(就他们现有的模式而言)更好地服务于学生、促进学习。这种转变跟汽车行业业已发生的变革类似:先前,福特的 Model T 一直统治着美国的汽车市场,直到通用带来了第四代的、更多样化的选择。