In the manifesto of the late Czarina against the family of the D'Olgoruckys,35 one of these princes is condemned to death for having uttered some indecent words concerning her person: another, for having maliciously interpreted her imperial laws, and for having offended her sacred person by disrespectful expressions.

  Not that I pretend to diminish the just indignation of the public against those who presume to stain the glory of their sovereign; what I mean is that, if despotic princes are willing to moderate their power, a milder chastisement would be more proper on those occasions than the charge of high treason — a thing always terrible even to innocence itself.36

  Overt acts do not happen every day; they are exposed to the eye of the public; and a false charge with regard to matters of fact may be easily detected. Words carried into action assume the nature of that action. Thus a man who goes into a public market-place to incite the subject to revolt incurs the guilt of high treason, because the words are joined to the action, and partake of its nature. It is not the words that are punished, but an action in which words are employed. They do not become criminal, but when they are annexed to a criminal action: everything is confounded if words are construed into a capital crime, instead of considering them only as a mark of that crime.

  The Emperors Theodosius, Arcadius, and Honorius wrote thus to Rufinus, who was pr?fectus pr?torio: "Though a man should happen to speak amiss of our person or government, we do not intend to punish him:37 if he has spoken through levity, we must despise him; if through folly, we must pity him; and if he wrongs us, we must forgive him. Therefore, leaving things as they are, you are to inform us accordingly, that we may be able to judge of words by persons, and that we may duly consider whether we ought to punish or overlook them."

  13. Of Writings. In writings there is something more permanent than in words, but when they are in no way preparative to high treason they cannot amount to that charge.

  And yet Augustus and Tiberius subjected satirical writers to the same punishment as for having violated the law of maiestas. Augustus,38 because of some libels that had been written against persons of the first quality; Tiberius, because of those which he suspected to have been written against himself. Nothing was more fatal to Roman liberty. Cremutius Cordus was accused of having called Cassius in his annals the last of the Romans.39

  Satirical writings are hardly known in despotic governments, where dejection of mind on the one hand, and ignorance on the other, afford neither abilities nor will to write. In democracies they are not hindered, for the very same reason which causes them to be prohibited in monarchies; being generally levelled against men of power and authority, they flatter the malignancy of the people, who are the governing party. In monarchies they are forbidden, but rather as a subject of civil animadversion than as a capital crime. They may amuse the general malevolence, please the malcontents, diminish the envy against public employments, give the people patience to suffer, and make them laugh at their sufferings.

  But no government is so averse to satirical writings as the aristocratic. There the magistrates are petty sovereigns, but not great enough to despise affronts. If in a monarchy a satirical stroke is designed against the prince, he is placed on such an eminence that it does not reach him; but an aristocratic lord is pierced to the very heart. Hence the decemvirs, who formed an aristocracy, punished satirical writings with death.40

  14. Breach of Modesty in punishing Crimes. There are rules of modesty observed by almost every nation in the world; now it would be very absurd to infringe these rules in the punishment of crimes, the principal view of which ought always to be the establishment of order.

  Was it the intent of those Oriental nations who exposed women to elephants trained up for an abominable kind of punishment — was it, I say, their intent to establish one law by the breach of another?

  By an ancient custom of the Romans it was not permitted to put girls to death till they were ripe for marriage. Tiberius found an expedient of having them debauched by the executioner before they were brought to the place of punishment:41 that bloody and subtle tyrant destroyed the morals of the people to preserve their customs.

  When the magistrates of Japan caused women to be exposed naked in the market-places, and obliged them to go upon all fours like beasts, modesty was shocked:42 but when they wanted to compel a mother — when they wanted to force a son — I cannot proceed; even Nature herself is struck with horror.43

  15. Of the Enfranchisement of Slaves in order to accuse their Master. Augustus made a law that the slaves of those who conspired against his person should be sold to the public, that they might depose against their master.44 Nothing ought to be neglected which may contribute to the discovery of a heinous crime; it is natural, therefore, that in a government where there are slaves they should be allowed to inform; but they ought not to be admitted as witnesses.

  Vindex discovered the conspiracy that had been formed in favour of Tarquin; but he was not admitted a witness against the children of Brutus. It was right to give liberty to a person who had rendered so great a service to his country; but it was not given him with a view of enabling him to render this service.

  Hence the Emperor Tacitus ordained that slaves should not be admitted as witnesses against their masters, even in the case of high treason:45 a law which was not inserted in Justinian's compilation.

  16. Of Calumny with regard to the Crime of High Treason. To do justice to the C?sars, they were not the first devisers of the horrid laws which they enacted. It was Sulla46 that taught them that calumniators ought not to be punished; but the abuse was soon carried to such excess as to reward them.47

  17. Of the revealing of Conspiracies. "If thy brother, the son of thy mother, or thy son, or thy daughter, or the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend, which is as thine own soul, entice thee secretly, saying, 'Let us go and serve other gods,' thou shalt surely kill him, thou shalt stone him."48 This law of Deuteronomy cannot be a civil law among most of the nations known to us, because it would pave the way for all manner of wickedness.

  No less severe is the law of several countries which commands the subjects, on pain of death, to disclose conspiracies in which they are not even so much as concerned. When such a law is established in a monarchical government, it is very proper it should be under some restrictions.

  It ought not to be applied in its full severity save to the strongest cases of high treason. In those countries it is of the utmost importance not to confound the different degrees of this crime. In Japan, where the laws subvert every idea of human reason, the crime of concealment is applied even to the most ordinary cases.

  A certain relation49 makes mention of two young ladies who were shut up for life in a box thick set with pointed nails, one for having had a love intrigue, and the other for not disclosing it.

  18. How dangerous it is in Republics to be too severe in punishing the Crime of High Treason. As soon as a republic has compassed the destruction of those who wanted to subvert it, there should be an end of terrors, punishments, and even of rewards.

  Great punishments, and consequently great changes, cannot take place without investing some citizens with an exorbitant power. It is, therefore, more advisable in this case to exceed in lenity than in severity; to banish but few, rather than many; and to leave them their estates, instead of making a vast number of confiscations. Under pretence of avenging the republic's cause, the avengers would establish tyranny. The business is not to destroy the rebel, but the rebellion. They ought to return as quickly as possible into the usual track of government, in which every one is protected by the laws, and no one injured.

  The Greeks set no bounds to the vengeance they took upon tyrants, or of those they suspected of tyranny; they put their children to death,50 nay, sometimes five of their nearest relatives;51 and they proscribed an infinite number of families. By such means their republics suffered the most violent shocks: exiles, or the return of the exiled, were always epochs that indicated a change of the constitution.

  The Romans had more sense. When Cassius was put to death for having aimed at tyranny, the question was proposed whether his children should undergo the same fate: but they were preserved. "They," says Dionysius Halicarnassus,52 "who wanted to change this law at the end of the Marsian and civil wars, and to exclude from public offices the children of those who had been proscribed by Sulla, are very much to blame."

  We find in the wars of Marius and Sulla to what excess the Romans had gradually carried their barbarity. Such scenes of cruelty it was hoped would never be revived. But under the triumvirs they committed greater acts of oppression, though with some appearance of lenity; and it is provoking to see what sophisms they made use of to cover their inhumanity. Appian has given us53 the formula of the proscriptions. One would imagine they had no other aim than the good of the republic, with such calmness do they express themselves; such advantages do they point out to the state; such expediency do they show in the means they adopt; such security do they promise to the opulent; such tranquillity to the poor; so apprehensive do they seem of endangering the lives of the citizens; so desirous of appeasing the soldiers; such felicity, in fine, do they presage to the commonwealth.

  Rome was drenched in blood when Lepidus triumphed over Spain: yet, by an unparalleled absurdity, he ordered public rejoicings in that city, upon pain of proscription.

  19. In what Manner the Use of Liberty is suspended in a Republic. In countries where liberty is most esteemed, there are laws by which a single person is deprived of it, in order to preserve it for the whole community. Such are in England what they call Bills of Attainder.54

  These are in relation to those Athenian laws by which a private person was condemned,55 provided they were made by the unanimous suffrage of six thousand citizens. They are in relation also to those laws which were made at Rome against private citizens, and were called privileges.56 These were never passed except in the great meetings of the people. But in what manner soever they were enacted, Cicero was for having them abolished, because the force of a law consists in its being made for the whole community.57 I must own, notwithstanding, that the practice of the freest nation that ever existed induces me to think that there are cases in which a veil should be drawn for a while over liberty, as it was customary to cover the statues of the gods.

  20. Of Laws favourable to the Liberty of the Subject in a Republic. In popular governments it often happens that accusations are carried on in public, and every man is allowed to accuse whomsoever he pleases. This rendered it necessary to establish proper laws, in order to protect the innocence of the subject. At Athens, if an accuser had not the fifth part of the votes on his side, he was obliged to pay a fine of a thousand drachms. Æschines, who accused Ctesiphon, was condemned to pay this fine.58 At Rome, a false accuser was branded with infamy59 by marking the letter K on his forehead. Guards were also appointed to watch the accuser, in order to prevent his corrupting either the judges or the witnesses.60

  I have already taken notice of that Athenian and Roman law by which the party accused was allowed to withdraw before judgment was pronounced.

  21. Of the Cruelty of Laws in respect to Debtors in a Republic. Great is the superiority which one fellow-subject has already over another, by lending him money, which the latter borrows in order to spend, and, of course, has no longer in his possession. What must be the consequence if the laws of a republic make a further addition to this servitude and subjection?

  At Athens and Rome61 it was at first permitted to sell such debtors as were insolvent. Solon redressed this abuse at Athens62 by ordaining that no man's body should answer for his civil debts. But the decemvirs63 did not reform the same custom at Rome; and though they had Solon's regulation before their eyes, yet they did not choose to follow it. This is not the only passage of the law of the Twelve Tables in which the decemvirs show their design of checking the spirit of democracy.

  Often did those cruel laws against debtors throw the Roman republic into danger. A man covered with wounds made his escape from his creditor's house and appeared in the forum.64 The people were moved with this spectacle, and other citizens whom their creditors durst no longer confine broke loose from their dungeons. They had promises made them, which were all broken. The people upon this, having withdrawn to the Sacred Mount, obtained, not an abrogation of those laws, but a magistrate to defend them. Thus they quitted a state of anarchy, but were soon in danger of falling into tyranny. Manlius, to render himself popular, was going to set those citizens at liberty who by their inhuman creditors65 had been reduced to slavery. Manlius's designs were prevented, but without remedying the evil. Particular laws facilitated to debtors the means of paying;66 and in the year of Rome 428 the consuls proposed a law67 which deprived creditors of the power of confining their debtors in their own houses.68 A usurer, by name Papirius, attempted to corrupt the chastity of a young man named Publius, whom he kept in irons. Sextus's crime gave to Rome its political liberty; that of Papirius gave it also the civil.

  Such was the fate of this city, that new crimes confirmed the liberty which those of a more ancient date had procured it. Appius's attempt upon Virginia flung the people again into that horror against tyrants with which the misfortune of Lucretia had first inspired them. Thirty-seven years after69 the crime of the infamous Papirius, an action of the like criminal nature70 was the cause of the people's retiring to the Janiculum,71 and of giving new vigour to the law made for the safety of debtors.

  Since that time creditors were oftener prosecuted by debtors for having violated the laws against usury than the latter were sued for refusing to pay them.

  22. Of Things that strike at Liberty in Monarchies. Liberty often has been weakened in monarchies by a thing of the least use in the world to the prince: this is the naming of commissioners to try a private person.

  The prince himself derives so very little advantage from those commissioners that it is not worth while to change for their sake the common course of things. He is morally sure that he has more of the spirit of probity and justice than his commissioners, who think themselves sufficiently justified by his nomination and orders, by a vague interest of state, and even by their very apprehensions.

  Upon the arraigning of a peer under Henry VIII it was customary to try him by a committee of the House of Lords: by which means he put to death as many peers as he pleased.

  23. Of Spies in Monarchies. Should I be asked whether there is any necessity for spies in monarchies, my answer would be that the usual practice of good princes is not to employ them. When a man obeys the laws, he has discharged his duty to his prince. He ought at least to have his own house for an asylum, and the rest of his conduct should be exempt from inquiry. The trade of a spy might perhaps be tolerable, were it practised by honest men; but the necessary infamy of the person is sufficient to make us judge of the infamy of the thing. A prince ought to act towards his subjects with candour, frankness, and confidence.

  He that has so much disquiet, suspicion, and fear is an actor embarrassed in playing his part. When he finds that the laws are generally observed and respected, he may judge himself safe. The behaviour of the public answers for that of every individual. Let him not be afraid: he cannot imagine how natural it is for his people to love him. And how should they do otherwise than love him, since he is the source of almost all bounties and favours; punishments being generally charged to the account of the laws? He never shows himself to his people but with a serene countenance; they have even a share of his glory, and they are protected by his power. A proof of his being beloved is that his subjects have confidence in him: what the minister refuses, they imagine the prince would have granted. Even under public calamities they do not accuse his person; they are apt to complain of his being misinformed, or beset by corrupt men. "Did the prince but know," say the people; these words are a kind of invocation, and a proof of the confidence they have in his person.

  24. Of Anonymous Letters. The Tartars are obliged to put their names to their arrows, that the arm may be known which shoots them. When Philip of Macedon was wounded at the siege of a certain town, these words were found on the javelin, "Aster has given this mortal wound to Philip."72 If they who accuse a person did it merely to serve the public, they would not carry their complaint to the prince, who may be easily prejudiced, but to the magistrates, who have rules that are formidable only to calumniators. But if they are unwilling to leave the laws open between them and the accused, it is a presumption they have reason to be afraid of them; and the least punishment they ought to suffer is not to be credited. No notice, therefore, should ever be taken of those letters, except in cases that admit not of the delays of the ordinary course of justice, and in which the prince's welfare is concerned. Then it may be imagined that the accuser has made an effort, which has untied his tongue. But in other cases one ought to say, with the Emperor Constantius: "We cannot suspect a person who has wanted an accuser, whilst he did not want an enemy."73

  25. Of the Manner of governing in Monarchies. The royal authority is a spring that ought to move with the greatest freedom and ease. The Chinese boast of one of their emperors who governed, they say, like the heavens, that is, by his example.

  There are some cases in which a sovereign ought to exert the full extent of his power; and others in which he should reduce it within narrower limits. The sublimity of administration consists in knowing the proper degree of power which should be exerted on different occasions.

  The whole felicity of monarchies consists in the opinion which the subjects entertain of the lenity of the government. A weak minister is ever ready to remind us of our slavery. But granting, even, that we are slaves, he should endeavour to conceal our misery from us. All he can say or write is that the prince is uneasy, that he is surprised, and that he will redress all grievances. There is a certain ease in commanding; the prince ought only to encourage, and let the laws menace.74

  26. That in a Monarchy the Prince ought to be of easy Access. The utility of this maxim will appear from the inconvenience attending the contrary practice. "The Czar Peter I," says the Sieur Perry,75 "has published a new edict, by which he forbids any of his subjects to offer him a petition till after having presented it to two of his officers. In case of refusal of justice they may present him a third, but upon pain of death if they are in the wrong. After this no one ever presumed to offer a petition to the Czar."