If Asia, with its dynamism and power struggles, in some ways resembles the Europe of 100 years ago, the Middle East is more reminiscent of the Europe of several centuries before: a patchwork of top-heavy monarchies, internal turbulence, unresolved conflicts, and nationalities that cross and contest boundaries. Europe’s ability to influence the course of this region, too, will be sharply limited.
如果说充满活力和权力斗争的亚洲在某些方面与一百年前的欧洲类似，那么中东更像是几百年前的欧洲：不稳定的君主制国家、国内的动荡局势、尚未解决的冲突、族群混杂且争夺势力范围，这些因素都掺杂在一起。欧洲影响该地区进程的能力也将是极为有限的。

Political and demographic changes within Europe, as well as the United States, also ensure that the transatlantic alliance will lose prominence. In Europe, the E.U. project still consumes the attention of many, but for others, especially those in southern Europe facing unsustainable fiscal shortfalls, domestic economic turmoil takes precedence. No doubt, Europe’s security challenges are geographically, politically and psychologically less immediate to the population than its economic ones. Mounting financial problems and the imperative to cut deficits are sure to limit what Europeans can do militarily beyond their continent.
欧洲内部及美国在政治和人口结构方面的变化也注定了这个跨大西洋联盟会失去重要性。在欧洲，欧盟一体化方案仍然得到了许多国家的关注，但是对于其他国家来说，特别是对于欧洲南部出现难以为继的财政赤字的国家来说， 国内的经济乱象是却在第一位的。无疑， 欧洲的安全难题在地理、政治和心理方面对于欧洲人的影响都不像经济难题那么紧迫。日益突出的金融问题和削减赤字的必要性必定会限制欧洲各国在欧洲大陆以外所能采取的军事行动。


Moreover, intimate ties across the Atlantic were forged at a time when American political and economic power was largely in the hands of Northeastern elites, many of whom traced their ancestry to Europe and who were most interested in developments there. Today’s United States — featuring the rise of the South and the West, along with an increasing percentage of Americans who trace their roots to Africa, Latin America or Asia — could hardly be more different. American and European preferences will increasingly diverge as a result.
此外， 当年大西洋两岸建立亲密关系时，美国的政治和经济大权基本上学握在东北部精英手中，他们当中的许多人祖上来自欧洲，这些人最为关注欧洲的发展。如今的美国和过去截然不同，凸显为美国南部和西部的兴盛， 且非裔、拉丁美裔或亚裔的美国人越来越多。这样一来， 美国和欧洲的倾向性会越来越不相同。


Finally, the very nature of international relations has also undergone a transformation. Alliances, whether NATO during the Cold War or the U.S.-South Korean partnership now, do best in settings that are highly inflexible and predictable, where foes and friends are easily identified, potential battlefields are obvious, and contingencies can be anticipated.
最后，国际关系的性质本身也经历了一次转变。不管是冷战期间的北约还是现在的美韩伙伴关系，联盟关系在以下情况下最能发挥作用：高度固定且可以预知的背景;敌友易于分辨；潜在的战场显而易见；紧急情况能够预期。

Almost none of this is true in our current historical moment. Threats are many and diffuse. Relationships seem situational, increasingly dependent on evolving and unpredictable circumstances. Countries can be friends, foes or both, depending on the day of the week — just look at the United States and Pakistan. Alliances tend to require shared assessments and explicit obligations; they are much more difficult to operate when worldviews diverge and commitments are discretionary. But as the conflicts in Iraq, Afghanistan and now Libya all demonstrate, this is precisely the world we inhabit.
在当前的历史时期， 上述几项几乎都不存在。威胁不仅多样而且分散; 国家间的关系似乎变得情境化， 越来越取决于不断变化和无法预知的环境; 各国之间可以是朋友、敌人或者亦敌亦友， 就看是处于一周当中的哪一天了， 美国和巴基斯坦之间的关系就是个例子。联盟关系往往需要有共同的判断和明确的义务;如果世界观存在着不同而且承担的义务是自由决定的， 要运作一个联盟就变得困哪得多。不过伊拉克、阿富汗及现在的利比亚冲突全部表明， 这正是我们现在所处的这个世界的特点。

For the United States, the conclusions are simple. First, no amount of harping on what European governments are failing to do will push them toward what some in Washington want them to do. They have changed. We have changed. The world has changed.
对于美国来说，结论很简单。首先，再怎么喋喋不休地唠叨欧洲政府各国没有做到的事情也不会让他们朝着华盛顿希望的方向前进。他们变了，我们变了，全出界都变了。

Second, NATO as a whole will count for much less. Instead, the United States will need to maintain or build bilateral relations with those few countries in Europe willing and able to act in the world, including with military force.
其次，北约作为一个整体的重要性将大为降低。相反，美国需要与欧洲为数不多的愿意并能够在全球事务中采取行动， 其中包括动用武力的国家保持或建立双边关系。

Third, other allies are likely to become more relevant partners in the regions that present the greatest potential challenges. In Asia, this might mean Australia, India, South Korea, Japan and Vietnam, especially if U.S.-China relations were to deteriorate; in the greater Middle East, it could again be India in addition to Turkey, Israel, Saudi Arabia and others.
第三，在构成最大的潜在挑战的地区，其他盟友可能会成为更加重要的合作伙伴。在亚洲，这样的盟友也许是澳大利亚、印度、韩国、日本和越南，特别是在美国与中国关系出现恶化的情况下；在大中东地区，可能还是需要印度这个盟友，此外还有土耳其、以色列、沙特阿拉伯及其他国家。

None of this justifies a call for NATO’s abolition. The alliance still includes members whose forces help police parts of Europe and who could contribute to stability in the Middle East. But it is no less true that the era in which Europe and transatlantic relations dominated U.S. foreign policy is over. The answer for Americans is not to browbeat Europeans for this, but to accept it and adjust to it.
所有这些都不能成为要求废除北约的理由。这个联盟中仍有一些成员国在用本国部队帮助维护欧洲部分地区的治安，有的成员国可以为中东地区的稳定作出贡献。不过同样确定无疑的一点是，欧洲和跨大西洋关系主导美国外交政策的时代已经结束。对于美国人来说， 解决之道不是为此威逼欧洲，而是应该接受现实， 并作出相应的调整。

Richard N. Haass is president of the Council on Foreign Relations. The director of policy and planning at the State Department from 2001 to 2003, he is the author of “War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars.”
查德.N.哈斯任美国外交学会会长。曾在2001 至2003年担任美国国务院政策规划办公室主任，著有《必要之战、选择之战：两场伊拉克战争回忆录》一书。